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Personal On-Line 
Payments
he rapid growth of e-commerce and the Internet has led to 
the development of new payment mechanisms capable 
of tapping the Internet’s unique potential for speed and 
convenience. A recent and especially successful example 
of such a development is the personal on-line payment: 
a mechanism that uses web and e-mail technologies to 
facilitate transfers between individuals.1 
In a typical transaction of this type, the payer accesses the 
payment provider’s web site to initiate a funds transfer. The 
payer enters information about the transfer along with 
payment delivery instructions. Notification of the transfer is 
sent to the payee by e-mail; confirmation by the payee also 
occurs via e-mail. The payment provider’s computer then 
transfers the funds.
The first on-line payment systems were created by dot-com 
start-ups in 1999, and their usefulness quickly became 
apparent in on-line auctions. These systems grew out of the 
limitations of retail payment instruments in meeting the needs 
of auction participants. Most notably, the on-line systems’ 
Internet integration greatly simplified the logistics of making 
and receiving auction payments. By offering virtually 
instantaneous funds transfer, the systems made for a much 
faster payment process than did paper checks, which can take 
up to five business days to clear. Credit and debit cards, obvious 
alternatives to checks, have also been unsuitable for most 
auction sellers because few individuals are equipped to receive 
payments this way. Moreover, on-line payments are 
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• Personal on-line payment systems—
Internet-based systems for making small retail 
payments—have recently emerged as an 
alternative to cash, checks, and credit cards.
• All these systems use the web to convey 
payment information, but they differ in the 
type of accounts they access: In proprietary 
account systems, funds are transferred 
between special-purpose accounts 
maintained by a nonbank provider; in bank-
account-based systems, funds are transferred 
between demand deposit accounts at banks.
• Increased acceptance of this payment 
method will depend on effective risk control 
and improved settlement arrangements 
among nonbank providers, a group that 
currently does not participate in a common 
clearing system.
• On-line payments are unlikely to have a 
significant impact on monetary policy, but 
they do raise some regulatory issues relating 
to consumer rights and protection.
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inexpensive compared with credit and debit cards, whose 
providers typically charge a fee of at least 2 percent of the 
transaction, with even higher fees for smaller merchants.2 
Recently, major financial institutions have also begun to 
offer similar personal on-line payment services—a sign of the 
systems’ increasingly widespread acceptance.3 Today, there are 
at least twelve providers. The volume of personal on-line 
payments, however, is still tiny compared with check volumes. 
Although comprehensive data are not available for these 
relatively new systems, a rough estimate is that 500,000 
personal on-line payments are made each day and $20 million 
resides in the accounts of the payment providers. By 
comparison, check volumes were approximately 186 million 
payments per day in 1999 and $600 billion was on deposit in 
domestic commercial bank transaction accounts in 2000.4 
Nevertheless, the number of personal on-line payments has 
grown rapidly over the past three years, and their use in the 
United States has already surpassed the use of other new 
electronic methods such as general-purpose “smart cards.”5 
Comprehensive industry data again are not available, but one 
leading payment provider reported 100,000 transactions per 
day in August 2000 (less than one year after it launched its 
service) and 200,000 per day by August 2001. Over that same 
period, the number of users reportedly increased from 
approximately 3.5 million to 10 million, and the provider 
estimates that its user base is currently growing at roughly 
70 percent per year.
In this article, we examine the personal on-line payment 
instrument and some of the issues brought to the surface by its 
development. We sketch the features common to most of the 
recent instruments of this type as well as draw a distinction 
between payment instruments based on existing bank accounts 
and those provided by nonbanks. The problems created by the 
proliferation of different systems and the importance of 
interoperability are also addressed, as are issues related to risk 
management and regulatory and monetary policy. We conclude 
with some general observations on these unique instruments. 
Types of Personal On-Line 
Payment Systems
The distinguishing feature of the personal on-line payment 
instrument is its use of the Internet for communicating 
payment information (Box 1). In fact, these systems are the 
first to successfully exploit the Internet for that purpose. 
Typically, payments are initiated from the payment provider’s 
secure web site, with notification taking place via e-mail. This 
arrangement cleverly utilizes the increasingly ubiquitous 
electronic address and delivery system to alert a payee that 
funds have been sent or to request funds from a payer. 
How Do the Systems Work?
The first step in a typical transaction is initiation: the payer 
accesses the payment provider’s web site, using a secure, 
encrypted connection, where he enters the amount of the funds 
transfer and the e-mail address of the recipient. In the 
notification step, the provider’s computer sends a message to 
the recipient containing a hyperlink to the provider’s web site. 
Confirmation takes place when the recipient clicks on this link, 
establishes a secure connection to the provider’s server, and 
confirms the funds transfer.
Although the mechanics of the transaction are similar, the 
systems differ according to the type of accounts from which 
the funds are drawn and the payment networks used for 
completing the transaction. Personal on-line payment systems 
introduced thus far generally fall into one of two categories: 
those based on proprietary accounts held at the provider itself 
and those based on bank accounts. Bank-based systems can be 
classified further according to whether they use Automated 
Clearing House (ACH) or automated teller machine (ATM)/
point-of-sale (POS) debit card payment networks.
The distinguishing feature of the personal 
on-line payment instrument is its use of 
the Internet for communicating payment 
information.
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Proprietary Account Systems
The first systems introduced were based on proprietary, 
nonbank accounts. In these systems, values are transferred 
between special-purpose accounts created and maintained by a 
nonbank provider. Deposits to the account can be made using 
a credit card, directly from a bank account via the ACH 
network, or by paper check. An important advantage of these 
systems is the extremely quick and simple process of 
completing intraprovider payments: the payment is made 
through a book-entry transfer and occurs almost immediately 
after the receiver acknowledges receipt of the e-mail. 
A typical person-to-person payment transaction is pre-
sented in Exhibit 1. The payer begins by transferring 
(“downloading”) funds from an existing bank or credit card 
account to his account at the payment provider. The payer then 
Box 1
What Is a Payment Instrument?
A payment is a transfer of monetary value from one person 
to another. A payment system is the mechanism—the rules, 
institutions, people, markets, and agreements—that make the 
exchange of payments possible. In general, three elements are 
required to accomplish this task on a widespread scale: a secure 
communications system, a set of accounts in which the value to 
be transferred is stored, and a method of moving value from 
one account to another. The last element is sometimes called 
the clearing and settlement system. A payment instrument 
consists of the instructions to transfer value bundled together 
with the communications system. A payment instrument may 
use a unique clearing and settlement system or one that is 
shared among many payment instruments. 
Consider a check. Checks are nothing more than written 
instructions, delivered by hand or by mail, directing the 
payer’s bank to transfer account balances from the check 
writer to the payee. The payee’s bank utilizes the system for 
clearing check payments to have funds transferred from the 
check writer’s bank to it, typically at a collecting bank at which 
they both hold accounts. An analogous arrangement 
characterizes credit card transactions. For payments 
processed electronically, the card, together with the terminal, 
creates instructions communicated (in an encrypted format) 
over telephone lines to transfer money from a line of credit of 
the cardholder to the payee, again using a clearing and 
settlement system to transfer funds between the banks 
involved. 
Cash is unique as a payment instrument in that it self-
clears. It represents value (a liability of the central bank) that 
is not in an account, but is instead a circulating liability. This 
feature of cash is supported, at least in part, by its role as legal 
tender—that is, cash discharges a debt by force of law. As 
such, the value is transferred at the same time the (hard-to-
counterfeit) cash is exchanged. In effect, the communications 
system for cash, which is hand-to-hand transfer, also provides 
its clearing and settlement mechanism.
Wholesale payment systems, such as the Federal Reserve 
System’s Fedwire funds transfer service, work in a similar 
fashion to checks and credit cards. Instructions to transfer 
funds flow through a communications network operated over 
telephone lines to the Federal Reserve and its participant 
banks. The Federal Reserve then deducts funds from the 
account of the sending bank, credits them to the account of 
the receiving bank, and notifies both banks of the completion 
of the transaction. Because of the large amounts that are often 
involved, wholesale systems typically restrict participation to 
banks, although banks can offer their customers the ability to 
use these systems indirectly, while retail systems are intended 
for widespread use by households and firms. In addition, 
most wholesale payment systems today offer final settlement 
of the funds transfer between the two banks on the same 
day—if not in the same minute—as the instruction is entered, 
while retail systems typically offer final settlement with a delay 
of at least one day.a 
Payment instruments can be differentiated according to 
whether they provide distinct means of conveying the 
instructions to transfer balances between the payer and the 
payee. Different instruments may be used to transfer value 
into or out of the same account: checks and Automated 
Clearing House debits, for example. By the same token, it is 
also possible for the different instruments to utilize the same 
underlying clearing and settlement system. In fact, many 
personal on-line payment instruments do just that.
aSettlement becomes final when the transfer of funds has occurred 
and is irrevocable, even, for example, if the payer’s bank fails.38 Personal On-Line Payments
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initiates the transfer on the provider’s web site, the recipient is 
notified via e-mail, and the transfer is confirmed. Once the 
process is complete, the provider’s computer transfers the 
value between the two users’ accounts. The recipient can leave 
the funds in the account for future use, or she may opt to move 
them to a traditional bank or credit card account.
Two features unique to proprietary account systems are 
worth noting. First, payments to payees not signed up with the 
same provider either require the payee to establish an account 
or the provider to use a conventional payment instrument to 
effect the funds transfer. A payment destined for a bank 
demand deposit account (DDA) would utilize the ACH 
network or a paper check. Alternatively, the payment could be 
completed via a “chargeback” to the payee’s credit card. 
Second, payers who do not wish to maintain a balance with the 
provider usually can charge payments to a credit card—
effectively a just-in-time transfer of value into the account. A 
key factor in determining whether users decide to maintain 
positive balances, or opt instead to upload and download funds 
as needed, is the frequency with which they expect to make 
payments; this, in turn, will depend on whether on-line 
payments become widely accepted and the degree of 
interoperability between competing systems. Broader 
acceptance and greater interoperability will tend to increase the 
usage of on-line payments and thus lead to larger average 
balances maintained in providers’ accounts.
Thus far, these proprietary on-line payment services have 
remained free for consumer transactions, although the transfer 
of funds to or from the provider sometimes incurs a fee. In an 
apparent effort to encourage the use of credit cards for such 
services, credit card companies usually treat the download of 
value into these accounts as a sale, rather than as a cash 
advance, which allows the user to avoid interest and cash-
advance charges. The provider absorbs the “interchange fee” 
associated with the transaction, although at least one provider 
charges a small fee for credit card downloads and ATM 
withdrawals.6 Businesses and high-volume individuals 
typically pay fees for receiving funds and transferring the funds 
into DDA accounts. The sum of these two fees is approximately 
the same as the credit card providers’ discount fee, making the 
cost competitive with traditional credit cards.
One drawback of e-mail-based on-line payments is that they 
are rather cumbersome for person-to-business payments. Most 
businesses prefer to have funds transferred automatically to an 
existing account, rather than receiving an e-mail notification 
and manually confirming each transfer. This limitation has led 
to a variation on the basic personal on-line payment scheme—
one that combines a proprietary account with a “virtual” 
signature-based debit card. In such a system, the account 
holder downloads value to his account in the usual way, but 
initiation takes place on the merchant’s web site rather than on 
the provider’s. The transfer of value takes place over a debit FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 39
Exhibit 2
Person-to-Person On-Line Payment: Bank-Account-Based System
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card network (either MasterCard’s MasterMoney or Visa’s 
VisaCheck, but currently not over a PIN-based debit card 
system) and settles the next day, just like any other debit card 
transaction. A major attraction of such a hybrid system is 
that it leverages the existing debit card network, so it is 
automatically accepted by the millions of businesses already set 
up to take debit cards. In addition, the user can employ the 
debit card in the conventional way to withdraw cash from 
ATMs and make other purchases at the point of sale.
Bank-Account-Based Systems
Although systems based on proprietary accounts were the first 
to appear, a number of providers—typically banks—more 
recently have developed systems that obviate the need to 
establish a special-purpose transaction account. In these 
systems, the web and e-mail communications links are similar, 
but the systems allow a payer to transfer funds directly from his 
account to that of the payee, even when the payee’s account is 
at a different bank. As in the proprietary-account-based 
systems, payments from credit cards are also possible, as are 
payments to credit card accounts via a chargeback transaction. 
(However, not all providers treat a credit card payment as a 
purchase rather than a cash advance.) 
Exhibit 2 depicts a simple transfer of funds in a DDA-based 
system. The initiation, notification, and confirmation steps are 
essentially the same as those in the proprietary account system. 
The main difference is the source of funds and how value is 
transferred. Here, the accounts accessed are demand deposit 
accounts at banks, rather than proprietary funds transfer 
accounts set up by the payment provider. Essentially, the 
arrangement provides yet another way to access a bank 
account, supplementing the check, point-of-sale debit card, 
telephone-based automated account system, and automated 
teller machine mechanisms.
A further distinction can be made between those bank-
based systems that use the ACH network to transfer funds and 
those that use the ATM/POS network. The ACH network is 
relatively slow, typically requiring one to two days for 
transaction authorization and settlement. By contrast, the 
ATM/POS network provides a real-time authorization and 
guarantee to the payee that funds are available, and settlement 
is usually completed the next day. ATM/POS-based trans-
actions currently require the payee to give her ATM/POS debit 
card number to the payer, however, which adds a layer of 
complexity, as well as a security concern, not present in systems 
based on e-mail addresses. 
Furthermore, these bank-account-based systems are 
typically subject to slightly higher fees than the proprietary 
account systems. These amounts can either be a fixed charge or 
a fee based on the amount of the transaction. In some systems, 
the payer bears the cost; in others, the payee incurs it.40 Personal On-Line Payments
Proliferation and Integration 
of Systems
The number of providers of personal on-line payments has 
grown quickly in the past few years, and there are currently at 
least a dozen. In what has become a familiar pattern for on-line 
services, it appears that several firms have entered the business 
with the intention of quickly gaining market share. This pattern 
stems from the fact that payment instruments display what are 
known as positive network effects (McAndrews 1997), which 
accrue when an increase in the number of users of a good 
makes the individual user better off. In this case, more 
widespread acceptance of a certain provider’s system makes 
that provider’s services more useful and convenient for an 
individual user, by virtue of his ability to send payments to and 
receive payments from a wider circle of people. Product 
differentiation can work against the network effects, however, 
as differences between products can be valuable to users with 
different tastes or needs. If providers cater to customers with 
distinct tastes, the benefits of product differentiation can 
outweigh the gains from having a single dominant provider.
If no single firm establishes a dominant position, the 
fragmentation of the market among competing providers 
could limit the usefulness and convenience of any provider’s 
product. One way to mitigate that problem would be for 
different providers to employ some form of interoperability 
standard, as long as interoperability did not itself prevent 
product differentiation.7 
Clearance/Settlement and Interoperability
What does it mean to make payment instruments inter-
operable? Interoperability allows an account holder at one 
provider to make a payment to or receive a payment from an 
account holder at another provider.8 This can be accomplished 
if both providers participate in a common clearing and 
settlement system, the purposes of which are to account for 
transactions, transfer payment messages between the 
providers, and arrange for the transfer of settlement balances 
(such as balances at a correspondent bank or the Federal 
Reserve) among providers. 
Familiar check-based payments are interoperable in this 
sense: existing clearing and settlement systems allow a person 
who holds an account at one bank to pay an account holder at 
another bank by writing him a check. The check then travels 
between the payee and the two banks by way of the clearing and 
settlement system, and one bank transfers funds to the other at 
a third bank at which they both hold deposits.
The systems of the nonbank personal on-line payment 
providers currently are not interoperable in the same way: no 
clearing and settlement system exists that would allow an 
account holder on PayPal, for example, to send funds directly 
to an account holder on ecount.9 To effect such a transfer, 
either the payer or the payee must first register as an account 
holder with the other provider and then complete the 
transaction using other payment instruments. Suppose, for 
instance, that the payee signed up with the payer’s provider. 
The recipient would then have to request that the funds be 
transferred to her credit card, wait for the funds to clear, and 
then use the credit card to add funds to her original account. 
Thus, the systems provide only indirect interoperability 
through their use of other payment instruments, such as credit 
cards and checks.
The lack of interoperability imposes obvious costs on users, 
such as the inconvenience of maintaining accounts at multiple 
providers, not to mention any fees associated with transferring 
funds between the various accounts. Yet despite these costs, 
providers may still prefer not to make their systems 
interoperable. Notwithstanding the expense involved in 
creating and managing a clearing and settlement system, 
interoperability can work to make the products more closely 
substitutable and thereby increase the competition between the 
products. The requirement to open an account in order to 
receive funds, for example, has been a key element in some 
providers’ “viral” marketing schemes. Although costly, the lack 
of interoperability is not necessarily inefficient, however, 
especially in such a dynamic, rapidly evolving industry. 
The gains from imposing full interoperability through 
governmental or industry action would need to be weighed 
against the gains from product differentiation and further 
innovation.
In Canada, the interoperability issue has been resolved by 
mutual agreement among that country’s five leading banks. 
The agreed-upon system uses Canada’s single clearing and 
Payment instruments display . . . positive 
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settlement system for interbank payments to transfer funds 
between banks (for those recipients who do not wish to receive 
funds on their credit cards). Two factors help explain Canada’s 
rapid, unanimous adoption of a single system. One is Canada’s 
relatively concentrated banking industry (most demand 
deposits reside at one of the five largest banks). The second is 
the country’s unified payment infrastructure, which uses a 
single clearing and settlement system for all interbank 
transfers, large and small: check, ATM, ACH, and POS. 
The fully interoperable Canadian system provides an 
interesting juxtaposition to the more fragmented, less bank-
oriented American system. Given the competitive industry 
dynamics in the United States, it is unlikely that the different 
payment providers will agree upon the adoption of a new 
clearing and settlement system in the near future. Instead, the 
providers will likely continue to rely on the interoperability of 
each of their systems with the clearing and settlement systems 
of banks and credit card associations.
There are, however, a number of steps that nonbank on-line 
payment providers could take to improve interoperability, 
short of adopting a common clearing and settlement system. 
For instance, the providers could each hold an account in a 
common bank, which would effectively serve as the system’s 
settlement agent: when transfers are completed in the common 
bank, settlement would be complete. Another step would be for 
providers to employ a bank to make interbank funds transfers 
on their behalf (or even establish a bank for this purpose). 
Finally, providers could set up a clearing house arrangement 
for netting and settling payments.
Policy Issues
Risk
Providers of on-line payment instruments are concerned about 
the risks of fraud, operational failure, and other liquidity and 
credit risks because their success depends on maintaining a 
system that is useful to customers and protects the provider 
from fraudulent withdrawal of funds from the system. There-
fore, it is important to examine the risk control measures 
employed by these new systems to combat risk.
Fraud is perhaps the most immediate threat faced by on-line 
payment providers. To address this risk, all the systems register 
and communicate credit card information using a secure 
socket layer—an encrypted connection to the provider’s web 
site. The payer’s information is retained by the provider, 
reducing the need for repeated transmission over the Internet. 
Another risk control is a limit on the size of payments that can 
be made. Some providers, for example, limit transfers to very 
small amounts until the user’s identity and address are verified 
by conventional mail.
Risk is also posed by the extensive use of e-mail. The systems 
use this medium for various purposes: e-mail serves as a means 
of communication, the e-mail address acts as an addressing or 
locating system, and one’s e-mail response to a receipt of 
payment is used, in part, as a means of identifying the payment 
recipient. A single e-mail account shared by several people 
naturally will diminish the effectiveness of e-mail as an 
identifier and a means to communicate to only one person. 
As a result, additional means to identify the recipient become 
necessary. Increasing the number of hurdles a user must 
overcome to transfer value may lower system risk, but at the 
cost of reducing system convenience. 
It is worth noting that the leading personal on-line payment 
provider grew out of an encryption firm, which indicates that 
the sponsors recognize the importance of preventing 
counterfeit and fraudulent claims from being entered against 
the company. One company official stated that successful 
providers will have to supply world-class fraud prevention and 
detection systems to manage this type of risk. If these systems 
should mature and create a more universal, interoperable 
system, then the operational risks will loom larger simply 
because of the larger values involved. In the meantime, it is safe 
to say that the existing systems are already under intense 
scrutiny by security experts (as well as hackers) for any possible 
weaknesses.
Like traditional financial intermediaries, on-line payment 
providers also face a certain amount of credit and liquidity risk. 
So far, this risk has been relatively modest: the dollar amounts 
involved have been too small to create significant risk for the 
financial system. In addition, nonbank providers generally 
The success [of personal on-line 
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maintain the assets in money market funds or at banks, all but 
eliminating credit and liquidity risk. Therefore, as long as 
providers continue to keep their funds in short-term, high-
quality assets, credit and liquidity risk will not be a major issue.
Regulatory Treatment of Payments
One important issue that could affect the acceptance of on-line 
payments concerns the rights of consumers when using this 
payment method. The use of credit and debit cards is governed 
by a well-established set of legal rights, in addition to any 
contractual terms agreed to by the card issuer and consumer. 
In some cases, federal regulations grant consumers a certain 
amount of protection against fraudulent use of their cards as 
well as certain rights in case of errors made by the payment 
provider, including certain rights to resolve errors. Further-
more, consumers’ potential losses are limited under the 
regulations that govern those card payments.10
In contrast, most personal on-line payments (in particular, 
those based on proprietary accounts) do not involve a credit or 
debit card, and therefore the consumer may not enjoy the same 
set of legal rights that he would in a credit or debit card 
payment. These rights are governed instead solely by the 
private contractual terms set out by the providers in the user 
agreement. It is not clear whether consumers are aware of this 
distinction, particularly as many of them fund their on-line 
accounts with a credit card in the first place.11 
Regulatory Treatment of Payment Providers
Some personal on-line payment providers are banks and some 
are not, and this distinction gives rise to differences in 
regulatory treatment. Bank providers, for example, are 
required to hold a certain share (3 or 10 percent, depending on 
the level of deposits) as non-interest-bearing reserves, while 
nonbank providers currently have no such requirement. In 
addition, unlike nonbank providers, banks are required to hold 
a minimum level of capital. Banks are also subject to reporting 
requirements and periodic examination by supervisory 
authorities such as the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and state banking agencies. Finally, banks can avail themselves 
of deposit insurance for account balances up to $100,000, while 
nonbank providers cannot offer this protection. 
Because nonbank providers of personal on-line payments 
typically have chosen to invest in low-risk assets, the providers 
resemble “narrow banks”—institutions that hold only risk-
free, liquid assets, and by doing so avoid the threat of bank 
runs.12 Because of this feature, narrow banking is sometimes 
proposed as a way to render deposit insurance unnecessary. 
(Nonbank payment providers are not required to disclose this 
information, though.) Consequently, there is probably little 
demand for traditional deposit insurance. Fraud, however, is a 
major concern. In light of this concern, some on-line payment 
providers have offered private insurance against fraudulent use 
of their customers’ accounts, to enhance the attractiveness of 
their service. (This differs from deposit insurance, however, 
which insures against bank insolvency.) 
These issues raise the question of whether nonbank personal 
on-line payment providers are in effect banks. The answer 
depends on the definition of “bank.” If a bank is an institution 
that “takes deposits and makes loans,” the answer would be no, 
as these providers typically invest in money market assets, 
rather than loans.13 This is not the only definition of a bank, 
however. An alternative definition, codified in the Glass-
Steagall Act, focuses on the role of banks as deposit takers. The 
Act precludes any institution other than a state-licensed money 
transmitter or a state or national bank from engaging in “the 
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment 
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other 
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor.”14 From 
an economic perspective, as receivers of funds subject to 
withdrawal or transfer upon the instruction of customers, 
nonbank on-line payment providers might be deemed to fit 
this definition.15 Alternatively, certain nonbank providers of 
arguably similar services—for instance, money transmitters 
such as Western Union and traveler’s check firms such as 
American Express—are legally recognized and are licensed in 
several states to provide these services. 
The resemblance of personal on-line payment providers to 
narrow banks also raises the issue of the complementarity 
between lending and deposit taking emphasized in various 
theories of banking. Some recent theories—such as those of 
Diamond and Rajan (2001a, b), Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 
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(forthcoming), and McAndrews and Roberds (1999)—suggest 
that the provision of transaction deposits naturally lends itself 
to wider banking activity, such as lending. In those theories, 
the provision of transaction deposits creates a form of liquidity 
that can be utilized to make loans more cheaply than those 
offered by other firms. If those theories are correct, and apply 
to the personal on-line payment providers, then the providers 
might be transformed, over time, into more bank-like firms to 
take advantage of this economy. In contrast, the transmitters 
of small-value wire transfers and traveler’s checks, although 
similar to personal on-line payment providers, have not 
transformed themselves into lenders, as these theories 
might imply.
These theories suggest that firms that provide only payment 
services and maintain funds in low-risk and low-return assets 
may have a difficult time recovering all the costs of their 
activities. Again, the evidence provided by the long-term 
viability of wire transfer and traveler’s check firms suggests that 
some payment providers can earn normal profits without 
engaging in full-fledged banking. This evidence is supported by 
alternative theories of banking that maintain that the 
complementarity between deposit taking and lending is weak, 
and that the two activities can be separated without sacrificing 
efficiencies. 
Monetary Implications
The development of new electronic payment mechanisms 
raises interesting questions for monetary policy. Some 
observers have even expressed concern that introducing what 
is in effect a private currency may undermine the Federal 
Reserve’s control of monetary policy. Such concern is 
unwarranted, however, at least for the personal on-line 
payment systems described here. Although the widespread 
adoption of on-line payments may alter some familiar 
economic relationships or call for technical changes in the 
definitions of the monetary aggregates, on-line payments in 
their current form will not threaten the Federal Reserve’s 
ability to conduct monetary policy in the foreseeable future.16 
Perhaps because these systems all rely on the Internet, it is 
easy to overestimate their novelty: from a monetary perspec-
tive, personal on-line payments are in fact more evolutionary 
than revolutionary. For years, it has been possible to transfer 
balances electronically between banks, and the recently 
introduced bank-based on-line payment instruments do little 
more than make that technology more readily available to the 
consumer.17 In DDA-based systems, web and e-mail 
technologies therefore merely replace paper checks as payment 
instructions and communications links.
The growth of personal on-line payments at nonbank 
providers could have some monetary effects, but these would 
be of a minor, technical nature. Data on balances held at 
nonbank providers are not collected, nor are they included in 
the monetary aggregates (such as M1) as currently defined. 
This would make the aggregates an imperfect gauge of the 
reservoir of “liquidity” available for spending, and could 
further reduce the aggregates’ information content. If this were 
a concern, the impact could easily be remedied by extending 
the aggregates’ definition to include balances held at nonbank 
providers.18 In any case, prior waves of financial innovation 
have already diminished the information content of the 
monetary aggregates to the point where they have lost their 
status as policy targets.19 A related, and equally inconse-
quential, effect would be any change in the so-called money 
multiplier brought about by changes in the reserve-to-deposit 
or currency-to-deposit ratios, similar to the change brought 
about by the adoption of “sweep” accounts in recent years.
These technical factors may have some effect on the 
monetary aggregates, but they are unlikely to have a discernible 
impact on U.S. monetary policy or its efficacy. Although the 
textbook description of monetary policy involves the control of 
the money supply,20 current Federal Reserve policy focuses on 
an interest rate target, adjusting open market operations in 
light of changes in money demand. Current policy would 
thereby insulate interest rates from any shift in consumers’ 
preferences from reservable bank deposits, for example, to 
nonreservable balances at on-line payment providers. Only if 
the volume of bank liabilities per se mattered, would such 
changes affect monetary transmission.21
Looking ahead into the more distant future, some observers 
have imagined a world in which virtually all payments will have 
gone on-line, drastically reducing banks’ demand for reserve 
balances.22 Leaving aside questions of plausibility, such an 
extreme situation would undoubtedly present new and unfore-
seen challenges to monetary policy, and it is reasonable to ask 
whether policy would remain effective. A complete analysis 
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of that possibility is well beyond the scope of this article. 
However, it is important to emphasize that all of the on-line 
payment instruments described here retain the U.S. dollar as 
the unit of account, and as long as settlement ultimately takes 
place in dollar-denominated Federal Reserve balances, the Fed 
will retain leverage over short-term interest rates.23 
Indeed, payment systems based on nondollar standards 
have appeared from time to time, and some of these systems 
make use of the Internet for initiating and confirming pay-
ments (Box 2). If one of these systems were to gain widespread 
acceptance, it could, in theory, pose a more fundamental 
challenge for monetary policy. However, use of these nondollar 
systems has remained very limited, and given their costs and 
limitations, it is hard to imagine that any one of them could 




The new payment instruments described in this article are based 
on the U.S. dollar. Accordingly, although they replace paper 
currency or checks as a payment instrument, the dollar retains its 
basic functions as a unit of account and a store of value. The link to 
the dollar is maintained by the guarantee of convertibility: users 
may convert balances at par into cash, bank account balances, or 
credit card balances at any time. 
However, not all payment instruments are based on the 
dollar. Some actually replace the dollar with a proprietary 
or commodity-based standard and offer only limited 
convertibility into dollars. We describe below three examples of 
this “parallel money” and trace its origins to older, nonelectronic 
systems.
E-Barter
One form of parallel money has been developed for use in on-line 
barter transactions, or “e-barter,” which has grown in popularity 
among businesses. Typically, these arrangements offer 
participating businesses a way to trade their excess inventories for 
needed supplies.a Rather than posting prices in dollars, 
participants quote prices in the sponsoring firm’s proprietary unit 
of account. In most systems, there is a stated notional conversion 
rate between this unit of account and a dollar (usually one-for-
one), and in some cases it is possible to purchase e-barter credits 
with dollars. However, the provider is generally not committed to 
redeem these e-barter credits for dollars; consequently, the 
purchasing power of the credits could, in principle, deviate from 
dollar-denominated prices.
According to the providers, one advantage of e-barter is that 
it allows firms to economize on their use of cash. It is not entirely 
clear, however, how this translates into a real benefit to firms. For 
instance, if a firm has $1,000 worth of widgets to sell, it is hard to 
see the advantage in trading those widgets for $1,000 worth of 
barter credits, rather than cash. Tax avoidance is presumably not 
a factor, as e-barter providers report to the IRS the dollar-
equivalent proceeds of barter transactions. Instead, barter 
arrangements may facilitate price discrimination—that is, one 
can sell the inventory at two prices to two types of customers, 
distinguished by their willingness to accept barter.
Although monetary payment systems have almost completely 
displaced barter in modern economies, barter systems have 
occasionally cropped up in the guise of alternative currencies. 
Perhaps the best-known recent example is Ithaca Hours, which 
have circulated in the Ithaca, New York, region since 1993.b The 
unit of account in this system is the Hour, which is supposed to 
reflect the labor used in providing the good or service. Ithaca 
Hours may be purchased at a fixed exchange rate of $10 for one 
Hour, but like the e-barter systems, Hours are generally not 
convertible back into cash. 
E-Loyalty Points
Another money-like system involves the “points” some merchants 
offer their customers in return for the purchase of their products. 
Accumulated points can then be redeemed for prizes, or for more 
products of that company or a set of participating partners. The 
idea is to build brand loyalty by giving customers an incentive for 
repeat purchases. The ubiquitous frequent-flyer miles are the best-
known example of such a system. The idea has recently been 
extended by e-commerce providers, some of whom have begun to 
offer “e-loyalty” points for on-line purchases.c In fact, the S&H 
Green Stamps trading stamp program, popular in the 1960s and 
1970s, has recently been reincarnated as on-line “GreenPoints.”
Although these e-loyalty points resemble money in the way 
that they define a unit of account, they lack many of the essential 
features of full-fledged parallel money. Most conspicuously, the 
points are generally nontransferable, which prevents them from 
circulating as a medium of exchange.d No points are convertible 
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Conclusion
Despite their relatively short track record, personal on-line 
payment systems have already proven to be especially useful for 
accommodating small payments made in e-commerce. These 
systems are also providing a convenient alternative to paper 
checks, money orders, and cash for a variety of transactions, 
and they may replace credit cards for some small-scale retail 
commerce. 
Accordingly, we can make a number of observations 
relevant to the evolution of electronic payments. For example, 
personal on-line payments were developed in response to a 
specific market demand, and this fact likely accounts for much 
of their success. Persons selling items in on-line auctions could 
not accept credit cards—the usual way of making consumer-
to-business payments on-line—and checks represented a 
payment option that was neither integrated with on-line 
auctions nor particularly fast or safe. This attention to market 
demand allowed personal on-line payment providers to put a 
working payment instrument into the market quickly, and 
significant volume ensued. In contrast, some electronic stored-
value payment instruments, offered by smart-card providers, 
have been in development for years, and few real market 
transactions have yet to be processed on the providers’ systems.
Furthermore, personal on-line payment instruments use 
the systems of the credit card associations, the Automated 
Clearing House, and the electronic fund transfer networks to 
clear and settle payments. This relationship between the new 
payment instrument and the existing payment systems is 
therefore complementary. And while personal on-line 
payments will probably never replace conventional payment 
instruments, they may actually increase the number of 
transactions flowing through the credit card systems (a form 
of “clicks-and-bricks” synergy). As a result, by utilizing 
existing systems for clearing and settlement, personal on-line 
payment providers have been able to succeed where others 
have failed. The alternative—building a new clearing and 
settlement network from scratch—would have required large 
investments and would have offered users of existing systems 
a less familiar way to make payments.
A final observation concerns these new systems’ use of 
increasingly popular e-mail. The use of e-mail was innovative, 
and in retrospect it represented a natural approach to 
delivering payment information on-line. A lesson here is that 
the use of e-mail to deliver information, while relying on 
existing secure clearing and settlement systems to transfer 
value, may ultimately be more practical than more ambitious 
schemes to transmit digitized stored value directly. 
On-Line Commodity-Based Moneys
Perhaps the most radical direction taken by parallel money 
arrangements combines electronic book-entry transactions with 
a unit of account and store of value based on a precious metal, 
such as gold.e In this system, account balances represent physical 
quantities of gold and transactions are ultimately denominated in 
those terms. Balances can be converted into cash at the prevailing 
market price.
This arrangement represents the most complete parallel 
money system, encompassing all the traditional functions 
of money. Except for the ability to initiate transfers electroni-
cally, the system is indistinguishable from the one developed by 
medieval goldsmiths, in which paper claims on physical stocks 
of gold circulated in lieu of the metal itself. This arrangement was 
displaced throughout Europe in the 1400s by the fractional 
reserve banking system we have today. The main reason for its 
demise was its high cost: gold earns no interest, yet requires tight 
security to prevent theft. The same high costs will probably 
prevent on-line commodity-based moneys from gaining 
widespread acceptance, despite the advantages offered by 
electronic access.
aExamples of e-barter providers are Bigvine, uBarter, and BarterTrust. 
For an overview, see Lorek (2000).
bSee <http://www.lightlink.com/ithacahours>. Other local currencies 
are described in Graham (1996). A classic reference on barter systems 
is Radford (1945).
cExamples include beenz and Yahoo! Points.
dThe “dollars” issued by the Canadian Tire retailer were transferable, 
however, and enjoyed some limited circulation as a medium of 
exchange.
eExamples of such systems are e-gold, IceGold, and GoldMoney; 
also see Ballve (2001).
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Going forward, we note that other novel uses for these 
payment systems are in the wings. For instance, most on-line 
payment providers have plans to offer a capability for making 
purchases from mobile wireless devices such as cell phones. 
Another plan is to allow consumers to make anonymous pur-
chases by concealing their identity from merchants. A third 
goal is to enable small transfers to be made between individuals. 
Some providers have even marketed their products as a way to 
fund spending by teenagers and college students  while avoiding 
the risk of overdrafts and overrun credit limits. Finally, another 
use for these systems involves the delivery of on-line rebates 
and gift certificates, where integration with the merchant’s web 
site confers a unique advantage over paper checks.
Our review of these innovative systems suggests that 
although their monetary effects are not likely to be great, their 
regulatory treatment is likely to evolve. Moreover, the status of 
various issues relating to personal on-line payments remains 
open to discussion. These issues include the incorporation of  
payment transactions in the monetary aggregates, consumer 
protection rights, the regulatory regime to which the providers 
are subject, the insurability of deposits in the providers’ on-line 
accounts, and the reservability of the deposits. The develop-
ment of personal on-line payments therefore compels us to 
revisit two central questions of economics and law: What is 
money? and What is a bank?Endnotes
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1. Providers of this type of payment service include PayPal, ecount, 
Citigroup’s c2it, BillPoint, and CertaPay in Canada.
2. See Chakravorti and Shah (2001) for information on credit card 
fees.
3. However, on-line auctions still represent a major source of the 
demand for on-line payments: eBay alone reports that on any given 
day it hosts millions of on-line auctions, with more than 600,000 new 
items joining the “for sale” list every twenty-four hours. 
See <http://pages.ebay.com/community/aboutebay/overview/
benchmarks.html>.
4. The 1999 check volume data, the most recent available, are from the 
Bank for International Settlements (2001, p. 105). The level of deposits 
is from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2001, 
p. A15).
5. General-purpose smart cards differ from “closed-system” smart 
cards—which are widely used in some transportation, building access, 
document reproduction, and laundry facilities—in that the general-
purpose cards are meant to be accepted and used in a wide range of 
businesses. Closed-system cards are intended primarily to serve a 
single use.
6. An interchange fee is a fee charged by the credit-card-issuing bank 
to the merchant’s bank. Merchants pay a “discount fee” that typically 
is equal to the interchange fee plus a small markup.
7. The Visa and MasterCard credit card systems originally required 
that their members not issue the other brand of credit card, and if a 
member issued one brand it could not accept the merchant receipts of 
the other brand. The two systems later dropped these restrictions, 
essentially making themselves interoperable. The Discover credit card 
system and the American Express charge card system operate 
independently and are not interoperable (according to the definition 
used in this article) with each other or with Visa and MasterCard.
8. This definition of interoperability focuses on the use of a common 
clearance and settlement system for the instrument, rather than on 
technical aspects of interoperability. It is useful to point out that a 
person cannot pay another person with a check by increasing the line 
of credit on the recipient’s credit card. Instead, the check typically 
must clear and settle either for a cash payment or for deposit into the 
recipient’s bank account. In that sense, credit cards and checks are not 
interoperable according to this definition, even though both methods 
offer a widely used payment system.
9. Interoperability is less of an issue for bank-account-based systems, 
which all rely on the bank clearing and settlement system for funds 
transfers.
10. A number of federal regulations affect the rights and responsi-
bilities of parties using credit cards, debit cards, checks, or deposit 
accounts. For example, Regulation E establishes the rights, liabilities, 
and responsibilities of parties in electronic funds transfers and 
protects consumers when they use such systems. Regulation Z 
prescribes uniform methods for computing the cost of credit, for 
disclosing credit terms, and for resolving errors on certain types of 
credit accounts. More specifically, Section 205.11 of Regulation E and 
Section 226.13 of Regulation Z both prescribe methods of resolution 
of errors (of different sorts) by the payment provider. The Federal 
Reserve has not yet interpreted these regulations as applying to 
providers of personal on-line payment systems.
11. A similar set of issues arises in the context of “electronic money” 
and stored-value devices. See American Bar Association Task Force on 
Stored-Value Cards (1997, pp. 653-72) and Group of Ten (1997).
12. For more information on narrow banks, see Litan (1987).
13. The definition paraphrases the definition of a bank contained in 
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which considers a bank an 
institution that “(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the 
depositor may withdraw by check or similar means for payment to 
third parties or others; and (ii) is engaged in the business of making 
commercial loans” (Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
Section 2(C)(1) codified at 12 U.S.C. 1841(c)).
14. Glass-Steagall Act, Section 21A(2) codified at 12 USCS § 
378(a)(2). 
15. The definition of a “deposit,” given in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, is long and involves funds held by a bank. Therefore, 
at least in part, it involves the judgment that the institution concerned 
is a bank.
16. Blinder (1995) and Freedman (2000) reach similar conclusions on 
the likely monetary impact of stored-value cards and other forms of 
“electronic cash.”48 Personal On-Line Payments 
Endnotes (Continued)
17. A similar point is made by Blinder (1995).
18. Traveler’s checks are an example of a privately issued nonbank 
liability that is included in the M1 monetary aggregate.
19. This deterioration is documented in Friedman and Kuttner (1992, 
1996). Beginning in 1993, the Federal Reserve in its semiannual report 
to Congress reported only “ranges” for broad money and debt growth; 
even these were dropped in July 2000.
20. The canonical statement of this process can be found in Mishkin 
(1997, pp. 436-47).
21. Although most recent macroeconomic models have emphasized 
interest rates over monetary aggregates, the quantity of money 
remains a key element in some theories of monetary transmission, 
such as those of Fuerst (1992) and Stein (1998).
22. See, for example, Friedman (1999), Goodhart (2000), and King 
(1999).
23. See Woodford (2000). Friedman’s (2000) rejoinder to Woodford 
questions this conclusion on practical grounds, and argues that such 
developments could still decouple monetary policy from economic 
activity at the margin.References
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